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This week, the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation’s Friends of Ukraine Network (FOUN) National Security Task Force issued its timely recommendation on Enforcing a Peace Agreement or Ceasefire in Ukraine.
I highly recommend that you review those recommendations, especially if you are in government—U.S. or other. A copy/link is at the end of this email.
Directly below is an article, “How to Save Ukraine,” from National Interest, by two experts from the Hudson Institute. One is Peter Rough, who is also a member of the FOUN National Security Task Force mentioned above.
It is hard to keep track of all of the relevant pieces and players related to Russia’s ongoing war against the people of Ukraine and the West and what might be Washington and/or Europe’s strategic objective related to the war. No strategic objective has been clearly stated. “Ending the killing” is not a strategic objective, especially when, certainly, in my view, the genocidal instigator of this war – the Russian Federation’s stated strategic objective is the elimination of Ukraine.
What is talked about is avoiding Russia’s strategic objective and establishing some type of ceasefire or peace agreement. If that is to be the initial outcome, the National Interest article and FOUN’s recommendation for enforcement should be seriously considered and followed.
NATIONAL INTEREST
How to Save Ukraine
March 14, 2025
By: Can Kasapoglu, and Peter Rough
The path forward for cooperation between the United States and Europe on Ukrainian and continental security demands pragmatic cooperation and innovative financial mechanisms.
The transatlantic relationship is in turmoil. With the United States and Europe at odds over Western strategy toward Ukraine and Russia, a chorus of European leaders has questioned the reliability of the United States and sought to breathe new life into the concept of European strategic autonomy.
For many, this concept resembles Charles de Gaulle’s famous description of Brazil: it is the idea of the future and always will be. Yet, whatever the long-term prospects of European strategic autonomy may be, in the near term there is no way to help Ukraine fend off Russian aggression without an abundant supply of American arms, strategic enablers, and intelligence support. Unless it is prepared to give up the fight for Ukraine altogether, Europe and the United States will have no choice but to forge a sustainable way to cooperate in the weeks and months ahead.
Three Ways Forward
Three ideas can help to overcome the current impasse and resume support for Ukraine.
The first is the establishment of a European fund to purchase U.S. weapons and equipment for Ukraine. The resources to make this idea a reality already exist in spades. Norway, for example, is sitting on a €1.7 trillion sovereign wealth fund, yet it has spent less than €4 billion in support of Ukraine. Moreover, some €200 billion in Russian assets are frozen in multiple European jurisdictions, principally Belgium. Each day brings a new headline of Europeans pushing for more defense outlays.
This European money could purchase American weapons for Ukrainian use that cannot be procured elsewhere at scale. For example, no European nation except Türkiye produces indigenous multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) like the American-made M-142 HIMARS and M-270. Similarly, Europe is unable to match Russian artillery shell production, or even that of Moscow’s ally, North Korea.
U.S. air and missile defense interceptors mark another crucial area in which Europe has no available substitute for American systems. To be sure, such support must be weighed against U.S. readiness in other theaters. However, it is hard to imagine a business-savvy U.S. president like Donald Trump, who has already latched onto a deal for Ukraine’s bountiful mineral wealth, objecting to an injection of euros into the U.S. defense industrial base.
The second idea that can solidify cooperation between Washington and its European partners and allies is to continue Ukraine’s transition away from a vintage Soviet defense industrial base toward one that reflects Western standards. The example of Denmark’s 155mm-class NATO-standard Bohdana howitzer points the way. Instead of transferring off-the-shelf artillery pieces to Kyiv, Copenhagen granted production rights to Ukraine’s defense industry. Now, each month Ukraine produces around twenty Bohdana guns. Denmark then buys these weapons from Kyiv and donates them to the Ukrainian military.
This model can be applied to various weapons systems and joint ventures. Ukraine’s Western partners can provide Kyiv with an initial infusion of supplies or grant production rights to Ukraine, which can then develop its capabilities for battle. This idea minimizes some of the burden on the United States and Europe while simultaneously boosting Kyiv’s own capacity to provide for its own defense.
Third, Ukraine can strengthen its ties to NATO—even if membership in the alliance is not in the cards for the foreseeable future. Kyiv has already enjoyed Enhanced Opportunities Partner (EOP) status since June 2020. EOP status supports interoperability with NATO and helps Kyiv fight more efficiently. To intensify and accelerate this effort, NATO and Ukraine also agreed on an Interoperability Concept in 2023.
The Finnish Model
The West can take these arrangements as a point of departure. When it was an EOP nation, Finland, for example, participated in the enhanced NATO Response Force in supplementary roles. The Finns also signed a Host Nation Support Memorandum with NATO well before Finland became a member state, allowing allied forces to station in or transit Finnish territory during exercises or in the event of a crisis.
At a time when the Kremlin has essentially annexed Belarus and announced the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons there, NATO should consider an “as-if-member” partner role and Host Nation Support memorandum for Ukraine within the new NATO Force Model. Russia may object to such moves, but its own policy toward Belarus provides the West with a strong reason to proceed. Such a step would also help assuage some of the disappointment in Kyiv over Ukraine’s short-term prospects for NATO membership.
The path forward for the United States and Europe demands pragmatic cooperation and innovative financial mechanisms. By establishing a European fund to purchase American weapons, facilitating technology transfers, and deepening NATO partnerships, the West can demonstrate sustained commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship at a critical geopolitical moment.
The alternative—allowing Russian aggression to succeed—would undermine European security. For all the differences, the United States should recognize that its strategic interests are fundamentally aligned with Europe: backing Ukraine is not just about supporting one nation, but about preserving the European order and the fruits of cooperation it has long produced.
About the Authors:
Dr. Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Dr. Kasapoglu holds a Ph.D. from the Turkish War College and an M.Sci. degree from the Turkish Military Academy. Previously, he was an Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome, where he held a visiting research post at the NATO Cyber Center of Excellence in Tallinn.
Peter Rough is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where he directs the Center on Europe and Eurasia. Previously, Rough was the director of research in the Office of George W. Bush, in whose administration he also served. He holds a Master’s of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Click here to review the document
ROBERT MCCONNELL
Co-Founder, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation
Director of External Affairs, Friends of Ukraine Network
The introduction is Mr. McConnell’s and does not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation or the Friends of Ukraine Network (FOUN).