No discussion of Ukraine’s counteroffensive without honest reflections on the failures of the West (Washington)

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Putin’s maniacal war continues to kill civilians – men, women, and, disgracefully, children. The Russians purposely target non-military targets. And, demonically, after a shelling, they are waiting a certain number of minutes and shelling again, anticipating that in the Time since the first shelling, the first responders will have arrived and be themselves targets for the Russian artillery and missiles.

The West and especially Washington, has not responded appropriately since as far back as Putin’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. Repeated weak responses essentially invited him to invade Crimea and Donbas, and with a response not up to the task, he proceeded to his full-scale war starting in February 2022.

Among others, the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation’s Friends of Ukraine Network (FOUN) has consistently, since 2014, made Recommendations to the United States Government as to what assistance needed and needs to be given to Ukraine and supported its Recommendations through meetings, webinars, phone calls, and more. And the challenge may be greater today than at any time.

In this email, I present three things.

First is a simple, straightforward statement that we need financial support to continue and expand our efforts. At the end of this email, there is a link to contribute.

Second, I include here a link to but one of many interviews being given by members of FOUN pressing the case that the United States must do more. This link is to an interview General Phil Breedlove gave to Time. I urge you to listen.


https://youtu.be/wNpksQDeggg

And third, today, The Wall Street Journal published the piece set out below about Ukraine’s counteroffensive and what is seen as the war continuing into 2024. The article talks of where things go from here. As I believe such talk should not be presented without reflections on what the West has and is doing wrong, I insert commentary parenthetically throughout the article.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Ukraine’s Slog Prompts Focus on Next Year’s Fight


With big gains elusive this year, planners consider how training and new equipment might tip the battlefield balance in the spring

By Daniel Michaels

Aug. 13, 2023 8:33 am ET


Ukraine’s current campaign to retake territory occupied by Russian forces could still have many months to run. But military strategists and policy makers across the West are already starting to think about next year’s spring offensive. [“Strategists and policy makers” may want to look forward but before doing so they need to reflect critically on their failures to date.  If they grasped history – Kremlin – history starting with Putin’s invasion of Georgia and reacted appropriately we might not be facing the situation we have in Ukraine.  And, if Putin invaded Ukraine and Washington responded appropriately, Ukraine would have won by now.  Think how many lives would have been saved!  The West’s refusal to give Ukraine what it has needed, when it was needed has led to where Ukraine is today.  By “West” think of at least the last three American Administrations. In fact, I submit the last genuinely bold and meaningful statement directed at the Kremlin was: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall”.  Administration-after-administration since has been self-deterred from enforcing its will.  RAM]


The shift reflects a deepening appreciation that barring a major breakthrough, Ukraine’s fight to eject Russia’s invasion forces is likely to take a long time.


When Kyiv’s counteroffensive began in the spring, optimists hoped Ukrainian troops could replicate their success last year in routing Russian forces. But an initial attempt to use newly supplied Western tanks and armored vehicles to punch through fortified Russian lines stalled. [Give me a break!  Who realistically thought Ukraine would have quick success?  We had not given Ukraine what it needed, and it was having to move forward under circumstances the United States would never send her soldiers into an offensive.  No air superiority or even parity.  No long-range artillery capability.  And in addition to our denying Ukraine these capabilities, we assured Russia sanctuaries from which it could and is shelling Ukraine with impunity.  It is appalling – Washington touts its support yet ties Ukraine’s hands behind its back.  Add to this our delays which allowed Russia time to build significant defenses.  There was no way Ukraine’s offense was going to be smooth and quick.  Think about this Washington does not want Ukraine to win and defeat Russia.  Washington wants to “be with Ukraine as long as it takes” to wear down Ukraine and Ukrainians to the point they will capitulate and negotiate the way Washington knuckleheads think is in everyone’s best interests – rewarding Putin’s bad behavior and expecting good behavior in return.  Myopic and dangerous to the core. RAM]


Since then, progress has been slow and painful, relying on small-unit tactics. A renewed push could still be in the offing. But military leaders and policy makers already are grappling with the question of what can be achieved in the next few months and how to prepare for a protracted conflict. [WHAT CAN BE DONE? Deliver ATACMS today!  Put them on a C5-A and deliver them – they are available.  And let our allies deliver long-range artillery! This isn’t rocket science.  RAM]


A nagging concern in Kyiv and Western capitals is that politicians and voters may come to see the war as a quagmire and sour on supporting Ukraine. Even if Kyiv’s Western backers stay resolute, clocks are ticking as Ukrainian forces burn through munitions, manpower, and stamina for a grueling fight. [Washington frankly is counting on voters losing patience.  If Washington grasp the fact that Ukraine winning on its own terms was in our own American national security best interests Washington would behave differently. Ukraine winning has never been an objective for the White House.  The President has not once addressed the nation to explain how important Ukraine winning is and how it is important for the United States. Those of us who have been in Washington for a long time know what you see when the White House pushes a priority.  There are Presidential speeches, Cabinet members are on all the talk shows, and there are endless trips up Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol to sell Congress. None of this has or is happening. This war is not a priority and Ukraine winning isn’t even the White House goal.  RAM]


All military campaigns end at some point—even in wars that grind on for years—at what tacticians call a culmination, or the point when advancing forces can go no further because of success, impediments, or lack of supplies.


Kyiv’s goal now is for its current offensive to culminate with sufficient gains to show Ukrainian citizens and backers in Washington, Berlin, and elsewhere that their support hasn’t been misplaced—and should continue. [Don’t kid yourself Kyiv and the people of Ukraine publicly thank the United States for the support it has given but they are not stupid.  They know they are essentially on their own. Ever since Putin invaded in 2014 every move – or lack of movement – on Washington’s part has been consistent with the so-called foreign policy “elites” and “realists” belief that Kremlin is an indispensable world power – there is Big Power foreign policy to pursue, and the rest might be important but essentially a distraction. Think National Security Adviser Sullivan and CIA Director Burns. RAM]


President Biden at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Lithuania last month told the Ukrainian president and a cheering crowd that U.S. support will remain steadfast. The U.S., NATO allies, and Japan pledged to develop long-term security plans for Ukraine. The Pentagon continues to supply Ukraine with advanced weaponry—most recently deadly cluster munitions—and allies are increasing the lethality of what they supply, with weapons such as air-launched cruise missiles. [Saying what they will do and doing it at entirely different things. Yes, on the unique American cluster bombs, and let’s not get carried away with what else has been delivered.  And always remember ATACMS continue to be openly denied. RAM]


Senior military leaders, meanwhile, have for months warned that Ukraine’s relatively quick gains of last year wouldn’t easily be repeated. U.S. Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has repeatedly poured cold water on suggestions that Kyiv could quickly slice through a land corridor that Russia holds along Ukraine’s southeast or isolate the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia seized from Ukraine in 2014.


Similar caution is now more widespread in the White House, said Ivo Daalder, who was former President Barack Obama’s ambassador to NATO. “I do think there’s a realization in the administration that Ukraine’s not going to be regaining all its territory any time soon,” Daalder said.


U.S. and other Western officials have hoped that a significant Ukrainian breakthrough could bruise Russian forces enough to bring President Vladimir Putin to a negotiating table as soon as this winter for serious talks about some kind of settlement. Chances of that happening now appear slim, diplomats say. [Unrealistic dreams passed off as serious thought?  RAM]


Instead, Russia is reinforcing its physical defenses in Ukraine, adding more soldiers and ramping up production of ammunition and weaponry. The West is also cranking up military industries, raising the prospect of a protracted war of attrition.


Fast movement on the battlefield last year and other quick conflicts since the Cold War may have led observers to believe that modern warfare is inevitably speedy, say military specialists. History shows otherwise, with wars averaging from three to seven years with multiple campaign seasons, they say.


“This war could look like the Korean War, with rapid movement on the front line in the early months and then relative stasis—but it takes years for both sides to realize that,” said Dmitry Gorenburg, a Russia expert at the Center for Naval Analyses, a think tank linked to the Pentagon.


The Korean War, which started in 1950, was never settled and technically continues, albeit with an extended armistice. A tense demilitarized zone divides the heavily armed Korean Peninsula. [Really? Talk about Korea instead of what Ukraine obviously needs and we refuse to provide? RAM]


Other examples of Ukraine’s future that strategists point to include the Middle East, where Israel has been in conflict with Palestinians and its Arab neighbors since the Jewish state’s creation in 1948, and Northern Ireland, where violent opposition to British rule lasted for generations.


But even if there is no breakthrough this summer, Ukraine can keep fighting well into winter. Rain and snow might slow operations of heavy equipment such as tanks, but Ukrainian forces have proven most effective so far when operating in small units, often with lighter equipment.


“The Ukrainian military continues to adapt faster than the Russian military,” said Gordon “Skip” Davis, a retired U.S. Army major general and former NATO deputy assistant secretary-general.


Ukraine has committed only a portion of its best-trained troops to the offensive, and only some of the more than 60,000 Ukrainian troops trained by NATO militaries have been drilled in complex maneuvers known as combined-arms operations. With time, more Ukrainian troops and commanders will have received advanced Western training.


That training will help them put modern Western equipment to better use. Ukraine’s initial attempts to use European tanks and U.S. troop carriers in the offensive didn’t fare well, but by next spring Kyiv will have both more Western equipment and more skilled operators of the gear. [Didn’t fare well – go back to what I wrote earlier.  We have tied Ukraine’s hands behind its back. RAM]


“As time passes, Ukraine will eventually employ more of its NATO-trained and equipped brigades, while Russia will struggle to maintain its rate of fire and its front-line coherence,” Davis said.


By the middle of next year, Ukraine might also be flying U.S.-made F-16 jet fighters, which European operators of the plane, including Denmark and the Netherlands, are eager to donate. Pressure is mounting on Washington to provide ATACMS long-range ground-launched rockets and on Germany to offer Taurus cruise missiles. [Washington has delayed and delayed on even the F-16 training for Ukrainian pilots.  Within the last two days, the reports are that if Washington doesn’t find ways to delay some more the F-16 will not be in Ukraine’s arsenal until next summer. RAM]


A big question around F-16s is what weapons the U.S. might allow them to carry. Russia has antiaircraft systems that might hit the planes, raising concerns in Washington that Ukrainian fighters would just get shot down. Equipping them with munitions such as the Joint Standoff Weapon and Paveway precision-guided bombs could allow F-16s to keep a safer distance from the front. [And speaking of further delays. If history is any indicator the previous paragraph is laying the groundwork for another delay.  Remember – Washington does not want Russia to be defeated. RAM]


The West might also eventually provide more advanced equipment, such as sophisticated drones capable of air attacks. Early this year, U.S. weapons maker General Atomics offered Ukraine two of its Reaper MQ-9 drones for one dollar, an offer normally valued at more than $25 million. Nothing came of the proposal, possibly because of security concerns around classified technology on the robotic aircraft. Reapers can carry Paveway bombs and Hellfire missiles.


Working against Ukraine, in addition to weather, are potentially dwindling supplies of Western munitions and wear-on equipment already donated. Cannons and gun barrels can sustain only a finite number of firings before cracking or breaking, and heavy military vehicles require extensive maintenance—even if they are never in combat.


Russia also continues to reinforce its defenses in Ukraine, including by putting new land mines in some places Ukrainian troops have cleared them.


Strategists looking to next year and beyond hope that over time—even as Russia reinforces impediments to Ukrainian assaults—Ukrainian troops can acquire skills and experience that allow them to outmaneuver and outsmart Russian forces.


How politicians will view the war next year remains a widespread concern, especially because of the U.S. presidential election next November. Former President Donald Trump, the Republican front-runner, has suggested he would curtail support to Ukraine.


But many other Republicans continue to endorse U.S. help for Kyiv, including a large number of senators and many in the House, although some support tighter scrutiny of U.S. aid. In votes last month on defense appropriations, five amendments proposed by House Republicans close to Trump that would have cut aid to Ukraine were defeated by wide margins after more than 130 Republicans voted alongside all Democrats in rejecting them.


“I think that bodes extremely well for support,” said Daalder, the former NATO ambassador.


Concern that such support might fade if Trump were to regain the White House increases pressure on Ukraine and its supporters to deliver significant gains in the next campaign season if they aren’t possible this year. [Several points: (a) There is no question for the very first time ever there is a bipartisan anti-Ukraine faction in Congress. It is troublesome and very likely to get worse. But the immediate problem is the White House.  Congress has given the Administration more than the Administration has given Ukraine.  The bottleneck to get Ukraine what it needs right now is the White House. (b) The opposition in Congress – and beyond – is sure to grow because (I) as stated before the President and his team have not made the case to the American public; (II) Democrats who know Washington should do more are self-deterred from speaking out because Biden is their President and public criticism is not in the Party’s best interest; and (III) with several prominent exceptions Republicans are self-deterred from challenging the President for fear of being blasted by Trump who is a disaster on Ukraine and Russia. There are those making the case and pressing the Administration, but they are not current public officials or politicians. The public – the educated public – must speak out and press the political powers to do what is right for Ukraine, for the United States, and for the future of our world.  RAM]