‍While the United States is amid the evolving transition between Biden and Trump and there are reports that President-elect Trump will soon talk to Putin, and statements from inside Trump’s team change the timeline for the President-elect to end the war from 24 hours to the”first 100 days” Russia presses on its genocidal war.

Just yesterday Russia launched double airstrikes on a nursing home in Kursk Oblast where 70 people were staying,  Russia also launched a drone strike on Sumy Oblast that sparked a fire at children’s wellness center causing multiple casualties.

Russia is being Russia and the west is being the west.

It is past time for the west to change and to force Russia to change by seeing the Ukraine has what it needs to defeat Russia.

Below you will find two op-eds.  The first is by Washington Post’s columnist for Global Opinions, Josh Rogin.  The second is by Luke Coffey, a member of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation’s Friends of Ukraine Network and its Task Force on National Security.

The Washington Post

Opinion | Josh Rogin | January 10, 2025

How should Trump deal with Putin? Escalate.

The only way to compel Putin to make concessions is to increase the cost of his aggression.

Until now, the brutal conflict in Ukraine has been fought chiefly with missiles, bombs and soldiers, with deadly consequences. But as the war enters its fourth year since Russia’s full-scale invasion, the action could shift from the battlefield to the negotiating table. [We must all remember Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014 – over 10 years ago.  Remembering and stating this clearly is not trivial.  Along with the early occupation began the abduction of Ukrainian children, murders, rapes, torture of civilians, and more.  Hello world!  Because essentially you and your “leaders” tended to ignore the brutality and violation of many treaties, pacts, and the Budapest Memorandum, doesn’t mean there was no meaningful war being wages by Russia! RAM] President-elect Donald Trump says he wants to do a deal — and soon. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s own cynical strategy is to use negotiations to buy more time for his aggression.

Trump must avoid this trap. In his news conference on Tuesday, Trump doubled down on his promise to resolve the war quickly after taking office, underscoring his belief in a deal with Putin while expressing skepticism about Ukraine’s ambitions to join NATO. [Ukraine in NATO is discussed in the following op-ed.  RAM] Trump didn’t repeat his campaign promise to end the war “in 24 hours,” and Trump’s nominee for special envoy to Ukraine, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, reset the clock on Fox News the following day. The Trump administration now wants to broker peace within 100 days of taking office.

This continued desire for a quick win plays into Moscow’s hands. For Putin, who said Thursday he is ready to meet Trump soon, the deadline is an invitation to stall and extract concessions, knowing Trump might value speed over substance. By engaging in talks while escalating military pressure, Putin can string the United States along without making meaningful compromises. That will weaken Ukraine, sow discord among NATO allies and buy time for Russia to consolidate its gains. If Trump hopes to avoid being outplayed, he will need to recognize what every recent president has learned: Putin’s goal is not peace but dominance. He responds only to pressure [Emphasis added RAM].

Trump is not trying to surrender Ukraine to Russia, Kellogg says, but rather to “save Ukraine’s sovereignty.” Kellogg promised that the incoming administration would only support a deal that is “equitable and fair,” without elaborating on what that meant. Trump officials are reportedly considering various schemes, such as withholding progress toward NATO membership from Ukraine (at least for now), freezing the conflict along current battle lines and deploying European peacekeepers between the two sides.

Meanwhile, Putin’s rhetoric remains uncompromising, and his battlefield operations are only growing more aggressive. In remarks last year, Putin stated his terms for peace: Ukraine must surrender four regions that Russia occupies in part and pledge neutrality in perpetuity. These conditions are unacceptable to Kyiv but reflect Putin’s real objective: controlling Ukraine. Even Trump won’t be able to accept those terms.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s position is nonetheless precarious. He cannot ignore Trump’s remarks about possibly cutting off aid to Ukraine and must avoid being seen by Trump as the obstacle to peace. U.S. military and financial assistance has been crucial for Ukraine’s survival, and any reduction would weaken Kyiv’s ability to resist Russian forces. At the same time, surrendering to Putin’s demands is a nonstarter.

Trump is wrong when he says President Joe Biden caused the conflict, but it is true that Biden has left Trump with an unenviable puzzle. Though Biden provided significant support to Ukraine, his national security officials’ fears of an escalating conflict led to delays in the delivery of several weapons systems, such as long-range missiles, and a reluctance to push for bolder international sanctions on Moscow. These cautious policies, though aimed at avoiding a wider war, have left Ukraine with less leverage at the negotiating table.

Trump’s instincts as a businessman could serve him well in the next stage. He understands leverage, and most of his aides understand that he must negotiate from a position of strength. He and Kellogg have bought themselves some time, but the real test will come after the 100-day deadline. Will Trump then accept that more pressure on Putin, not less, is needed to end the war? Or will he fall for Putin’s familiar snare of endless negotiations while the Russians chew through Ukraine?

Many American presidents have begun their terms seeking a reset with Russia only to realize that Putin is an unreliable partner. Barack Obama’s “reset” ended with the annexation of Crimea. Biden’s outreach was met with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Trump’s early concessions, including his questioning of NATO’s role, risk repeating the same mistakes.

The only way to compel Putin to make concessions is to increase the cost of his aggression. This means ramping up military aid to Ukraine, imposing harsher sanctions on Russia and bolstering NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe. Trump, who says he wants a deal, might have to take the long road to get there: recognize Putin’s game, increase support for Ukraine and use U.S. leverage wisely.

That will take much longer than 100 days. But if Trump can adapt quickly, he might avoid the trap Putin has in store for him.

POLITICO

Ukraine can join NATO — if allies are willing to be bold

Right now, Russia knows all it needs to do to prevent a country from joining is to invade and partially occupy it — and that needs to change.

Opinion | January 13, 2025 4:00 am CET

By Luke Coffey

Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.

While it’s clear U.S. President-elect Donald Trump wants to end Russia’s war against Ukraine, how he’ll achieve this in a just manner that results in a lasting peace remains unclear.

The preferable approach, of course, would have been to provide Kyiv with the weapons and resources needed to restore control over its internationally recognized 1991 borders. But due to Washington’s dithering and indecisive approach, the U.S. only ever provided the country with enough assistance to survive — never enough to win.

This isn’t Ukraine’s fault. It’s the collective fault of America and its European allies.

But as speculation mounts over what a Trump-negotiated settlement might look like, we must consider two points: Ukraine must feel that any settlement to end the war is a fair one, and it must also feel secure from future Russian attacks.

The latter point is particularly crucial because history tells us that if there’s only a pause in fighting, Russia will likely return to try and finish the job.

This is why Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s comments about ending the “hot phase” of the war in exchange for NATO membership is so important. And though some will dismiss this idea outright, if Ukraine is willing to consider it, so should we.

Currently, there’s a lot of conjecture that the U.S. might ask Europe to provide a post-war security force for Ukraine, hoping to avoid direct involvement in future conflicts. But those who believe this would keep the U.S. out of any future war in Europe are being naive.

The idea that French, British or German troops could come under Russian attack without there being a NATO response is inconceivable, whether or not those troops operate under a NATO mission. Such a scenario would lead to one of two outcomes: direct U.S. military involvement or the end of NATO’s credibility and, by extension, the alliance itself.

This is precisely why Ukraine joining NATO could provide the best offer for enduring and effective peace in Eastern Europe. Not only would the country’s membership serve as a credible deterrent against future Russian aggression, it would also ensure meaningful burden sharing among NATO members.

And most crucially, even if a post-war settlement were to leave part of Ukraine’s territory under de facto Russian control, there’s still a responsible, realistic and reasonable way for Ukraine to join the alliance. To make this work, however, NATO and Ukraine would need to take three key steps:

First, as part of any peace settlement, Ukraine’s government would need to formally declare a “non-use of force” pledge to reclaim its occupied territories, and focus on a long-term diplomatic strategy instead. This shouldn’t be a problem, as Zelenskyy suggested this possibility already. Meanwhile, the pledge itself could be modeled after West Germany’s 1954 declaration on the eve of its NATO membership, which stated it “undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the re-unification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes.”

Next, all of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory — including the regions temporarily occupied by Russia — would be invited to join NATO, but only the areas outside Russian-occupation would receive the Article 5 security guarantee. Article 6 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty defines NATO’s area of responsibility as the “North Atlantic area, north of the Tropic of Cancer,” and as a result, U.S. territories like Guam and Hawaii, the U.K.’s Falkland Islands and France’s Réunion Island aren’t covered by Article 5. So, Ukraine wouldn’t be the first alliance member with partial territory excluded from the collective defense clause.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the alliance would then need to amend Article 6 to exclude Ukraine’s regions under Russia’s control. This amendment could be made during the accession-protocol process each alliance member undergoes before admitting a new country — and there’s precedent for this too. Article 6 was amended before Greece and Turkey joined in 1951, and in 1963, after Algeria’s independence, the North Atlantic Council acknowledged that Article 6 no longer applied to the Algerian Departments of France.

However, there are some who won’t agree with this process and will claim that countries are prohibited from joining NATO until any outstanding territorial disputes are resolved. But this is a common misconception that’s rooted in a poor understanding of the Study on NATO Enlargement, which was published by the alliance in 1995.

A closer look at this document actually shows that territorial disputes don’t necessarily prevent a country from joining the alliance, as the study reads: “States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes … must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the alliance” (emphasis mine).

Of course, prospective members would ideally resolve any outstanding border disputes before joining the alliance. But policymakers have to operate in the real world, not in the world they would like to be in. The Study on Enlargement clearly states the resolution of such disputes would be “a factor” — not “the factor” — in determining whether an invitation is extended, and there’s precedent for countries with border disputes joining NATO. Estonia, for example, which joined the alliance in 2004, still lacks a legally agreed border with Russia, and Croatia, which joined in 2009, has unresolved border disputes with Serbia.

Since its first enlargement in 1952, NATO’s open-door policy has greatly enhanced transatlantic security. But Russia’s malign actions in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova — and the transatlantic community’s inability [Unwillingness – RAM] to push back — have essentially given Moscow a de facto veto over future NATO membership. Right now, Russia knows that all it needs to do to prevent a country from joining is to invade and partially occupy it.

Temporarily amending Article 6 would deny Moscow this veto — starting with Ukraine. The only question is whether leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have the creativity and political will to make it happen.

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ROBERT MCCONNELL
Co-Founder, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation
Director of External Affairs, Friends of Ukraine Network

The introduction and parenthetical comments are Mr. McConnell’s and does not necessarily represent the views of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation or those of the Friends of Ukraine Network (FOUN).

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