Ukraine needs the U.S. and the United States needs a Ukrainian victory

10/16/2025

Putin’s war against Ukraine, the rest of Europe, and the United States continues, with far too many officials and voters refusing to see the reality of the Russian Federation and its intentions.

Russia will not stop until it is stopped, and to me that means Russia must be defeated, driven out of Ukraine, held accountable for the destruction it has visited upon Ukraine, and for its war crimes and its genocide against Ukrainian children. Those abducted children must be returned to their families. Anything less rewards Evil and leaves the question: When will Russia rearm and continue its quest?

David Kramer, an original and ongoing member of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation’s Friends of Ukraine Network (FOUN)’s National Security Task Force, has just published an excellent article, which I set out below.

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LAW & LIBERTY

Why Ukraine Needs the United States

Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine, which escalated into a full-scale invasion in February 2022, shows no sign of stopping. Putin’s strategy seems to be based on the premise that he can outlast Western support for Ukraine, expose NATO as a feckless alliance, and restore control over what used to be a Russian/Soviet sphere of influence.

The Trump Administration deserves credit for pushing European allies to increase their defense spending and to take a larger role in supporting Ukraine. But it would be a mistake to conclude that the United States can or should leave European security and the problem of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Europeans alone. That includes the idea of a European-led security arrangement for Ukraine. To be taken seriously by Putin, the United States would have to be involved in such security guarantees one way or another. [I note FOUN’s National Security Task Force published and distributed ENFORCEING A PEACE AGREEMENT OR CEASEFIRE IN UKRAINE: Preventing Russia From Resuming Its Aggression Is The Key last Spring. The document is available at the end of this email. RAM]

The Growing Russian Threat

For nearly two decades, Russia has engaged in a hybrid warfare campaign against the West with interference in various elections in Europe and the United States; disinformation; airspace and naval violations; assassinations (both plotted and successful) of Kremlin critics on European soil; economic sabotage that includes cutting vital undersea cables; and explosions of arms depots in the Czech Republic and elsewhere. Russia has paid little price for these acts of aggression.

Ukraine, of course, has been the principal focus of Russian brutality, starting with Putin’s first invasion of the country in February 2014. Russia killed more than 14,000 Ukrainians between that time and the full-scale invasion eight years later.

By February 2022, emboldened by America’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, Putin thought he would get away with an easy victory over Ukraine. He expected to topple the government of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, occupy most of Ukraine, and for Russians to be welcomed as liberators in a matter of days, weeks at most—all without paying much of a price from the West.

Instead, despite being significantly outnumbered and outgunned, Ukrainian forces defied Kremlin expectations and have inflicted more than a million casualties on the Russian side, regained more than 50 percent of the territory Russian forces initially seized, and essentially destroyed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainians have also developed their own drone technology and production that enable Ukraine to strike Russian military and energy targets deep inside Russian territory. This success is entirely homegrown: Ukraine now domestically produces well over a million drones per year, and these drones are responsible for over 80 percent of battlefield damage against Russian targets.

With more assistance from the West, Ukraine would be in an even stronger position today, and we might see Russia in retreat not by choice but out of necessity. Any diminution in assistance now would leave Ukraine more vulnerable, but Ukrainians will not give up, for they are fighting for their land, their freedom, and their lives.

Despite Ukrainian resilience, Putin is only escalating his aggression toward the West. Moscow is testing the West and the NATO Alliance in particular.

For the first time ever, a NATO member state had to engage militarily with Russian assets over its own territory earlier this month when 19 Russian drones violated Polish airspace over a period of seven hours. It marked the worst violation of the Alliance’s airspace since its founding in 1949. Since then, Russian aircraft have entered Romanian and Estonian (both NATO allies) airspaces. German and Swedish jets also intercepted a Russian military plane in neutral airspace over the Baltic Sea. And drones, likely from Russia, have caused havoc in the skies over Denmark and Germany.

In addition, Russian strikes have damaged the offices of the European Commission and British Council in Kyiv, Ukraine, and a Danish Refugee Council demining operation in eastern Ukraine, killing two people.

In response to these Russian provocations, Poland and Estonia each invoked consultations under Article 4 of the NATO charter, something any member can do when it determines its territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened. NATO, in turn launched operation “Eastern Sentry” to provide Poland protection against further Russian incursions.

Most Americans favor strong transatlantic ties and want to see the United States adopt a tougher stance toward Russia.

“In these times, we must act firmly, and, if violations occur, we must respond accordingly, including militarily,” Czech President Petr Pavel said in an interview with public broadcaster Czech Television. [He was even stronger at Forum 2000 in Prague earlier this week. I just returned. RAM] President Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, retired Army Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, speaking separately, agreed. “You have to look at Putin and Russia as an expansionist power,” Kellogg said in a recent interview with Lord Ashcroft, the former deputy chairman of Britain’s Conservative Party. “He wants to reestablish the Russian Empire—just look at history. Give him an inch, he’ll take a mile.”

Trump, Kellogg’s boss, was less assuring initially. “What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones?” he wrote on Truth Social. “Here we go!” When asked more recently whether the United States would back its allies if Russia continues to escalate, Trump’s reply was better: “Yeah, I would. I would.”

Yet when a Russian drone struck a US factory in western Ukraine in late August, the Ukrainian expressions of outrage were much louder than those coming from Washington. A minerals deal signed between Ukraine and the United States earlier this year was intended in part to demonstrate US support for Ukraine and discourage Russia from hitting where Americans might be present. That didn’t work.

Americans Support Ukraine and View Russia as a Threat

Contrary to the noise generated by isolationist factions within both Republican and Democratic circles, most Americans favor strong transatlantic ties and want to see the United States adopt a tougher stance toward Russia for its invasion and ongoing brutal aggression against Ukraine, recent surveys show.

About 86 percent of Trump voters view Russia as a threat to US security, according to a recent survey conducted by the Vandenberg Coalition. Nearly 80 percent of those same voters support stronger sanctions on Russian oil “due to Putin’s refusal to pursue peace negotiations in good faith.”

In a separate survey of a broader cross-section of Americans conducted by the Ronald Reagan Institute, 55 percent opposed a US withdrawal from NATO, 59 percent supported increasing the US troop presence in Eastern Europe, and 71 percent (including majorities of both parties) “support using American military force to defend NATO allies if attacked.”

These numbers reinforce the importance of US leadership when it comes to tackling threats from Russia.

Signals from the Trump administration, however, have been mixed. In mid-September, it approved its first European-financed foreign military sales to Ukrainethrough the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative. The sales are worth some $1 billion and include Patriot interceptor missiles and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, known as HIMARS.

Some 85 US senators support legislation to impose punishing tariffs and sanctions on purchasers of Russian energy, but Senate leadership has placed the bill on hold pending a green light from the Trump White House. The same is true for a new bipartisan REPO Act, which would “repurpose frozen Russian sovereign assets held in the United States for transfer to Ukraine every 90 days.” [The Republican controlled Congress seems unsure it is a co-equal branch of government. RAM]

The administration still has not imposed new sanctions on Russia for Putin’s refusal to engage in serious negotiations with his Ukrainian counterpart. It has conditioned any new sanctions and tariffs on seeing European countries end their import of Russian energy and impose their own tariffs on India and China.

In a serious blow to morale among the Baltic states, the Pentagon reportedly decided to end funding for the Baltic Security Initiative, which provides vital assistance for those countries along Russia’s border. That triggered bipartisan opposition from Congress. Rumors of US troop withdrawals from positions in Europe and reports that the administration’s new national security strategy focuses on defense of the homeland and the Western Hemisphere risk signaling to Russia that America is looking elsewhere. This feeds Putin’s thinking that he can prevail in Ukraine and get away with challenging NATO. [Who can say Putin’s is not a reasonable understanding? RAM]

Ukraine Needs and Deserves Western (Including US) Assistance

The best way to prove Putin wrong is to help Ukraine defeat Russia. This would likely require significantly increasing military assistance to Ukraine; tightening sanctions on Russia, especially its “shadow fleet” and its energy and banking sectors; lowering the price cap on Russian oil; imposing tariffs on countries that prop up Russia financially by importing Russian energy (already imposed by the United States on India but not yet on China); and seizing the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets and making those funds available to Ukraine. Such policies would reduce the burden on Western countries and hold Russia financially accountable for some of the tremendous damage it has inflicted on Ukraine.

After his meeting with Zelenskyy on the margins of the UN General Assembly on September 23, Trump posted, “I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form. With time, patience, and the financial support of Europe, and, in particular, NATO, the original Borders from where this War started, is very much an option.” The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump approved providing Ukraine with US intelligence to help Ukrainian strikes with “long-range missiles against energy targets deep inside Russian territory.” In addition, the administration is considering sending Ukraine Tomahawk missiles, which would be a big boost to Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities.

Ukraine has performed courageously in defending itself against a much larger military. But it remains dependent on the West for Patriot missile defense systems, long-range missiles, and financial support. Under the new arrangement worked out between the Trump Administration and NATO, European member states are purchasing American weapons and making them available to Ukraine.

Ukraine has indicated its readiness to observe a ceasefire and end the war in a just and sustainable manner. Putin, by contrast, has shown no such interest. Understandably, Ukraine seeks security guarantees to avoid having Russia, reinvigorated after a pause in fighting, invade the country again. Both the Biden Administration and the current Trump Administration have ruled out the deployment of US forces on the ground in Ukraine. President Trump, however, has hinted at the possibility of providing intelligence and even air cover for a still undefined European-led security arrangement. That will be critical for any hope of ending the war.

If Europe is to take the lead in some way, it must not be in such a manner that conveys Western weakness in the face of Putin’s aggression.

In addition to stepping up its purchases of American weapons for Ukraine, European nations have also increased transfers of their own weapons systems to Ukraine, including Patriot missile systems. They could do more to help Ukraine blunt Russia’s reliance on drones for strikes against Ukraine with cheaper weapons, such as netting, than those used against drones that violated Polish airspace. Germany still has not agreed to provide its Taurus missiles, which, like the American Tomahawks, would enhance Ukraine’s strike capabilities significantly.

Security Guarantees for Ukraine?

Days after Trump met with Putin in Alaska, the US president held talks in Washington with Zelenskyy and a handful of European leaders. The idea of a European-led “reassurance force” picked up momentum, as the leaders discussed “Article 5-like” security guarantees for Ukraine—a reference to Article 5 of the NATO charter, which considers an attack on one an attack against all—but without actual NATO membership for Ukraine.

A few weeks later, European allies met in Paris, and according to French President Emmanuel Macron, 26 countries committed to providing security assistance to Ukraine that would cover land, sea, and air. Questions abound about the reassurance force’s ability to deter further Russian aggression: Troops would not be deployed to the front line, where the heaviest fighting occurs. Nor would they be sent to Ukraine until a truce or ceasefire is in place. Alas, that gives Putin an incentive to reject any end to the war, absent a tightening of sanctions on Russia, imposition of secondary sanctions and tariffs on countries that import Russian energy, and a vast scaling up of military assistance to Ukraine. Indeed, sending European troops to Ukraine without taking those other steps would be reckless.

In an attempt to discourage any country from sending troops to Ukraine, Putin has argued that they would be “legitimate targets” for Russian attack. Even the very idea of providing military assistance to Ukraine would mean NATO countries are “at war” with Russia, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Russian journalists during a September 15 briefing. [It is staggering that European countries – and the United States – do not realize, or maybe accept, that Russia is at war with them! What will it take? RAM]

The West must not allow Putin a de facto veto over Ukraine’s interest in NATO membership, nor in Ukraine’s right to seek security guarantees and military assistance against further Russian aggression. This is the time for the transatlantic alliance to show Putin that it will not back down in the face of his muscle-flexing nor abandon Ukraine. As The Economist warned recently, “If NATO signals timidity, the risk of sleepwalking into a larger war will grow.”

Retired US Army Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt put it well when he wrote, “The most difficult part, of course, will be convincing European voters of the importance of forming and deploying such a force, as they will be putting their sons and daughters in harm’s way. But this is the cost of providing a security guarantee, ensuring an enduring peace and, if that peace should fail, being ready to defend not only Ukraine but the whole of Europe.”

The United States needs to do its part, too. In addition to applying significantly more pressure on Putin to end the war, the Trump Administration should reassure nervous European allies that, while we will not have troops on the ground ourselves, we will be there to provide critical intelligence and air support.

Finally, it would help for NATO members, starting with the United States, to reconsider the Alliance’s opposition to Ukraine’s membership. This would remove the confusion surrounding “Article 5-like” security guarantees and make clear for all NATO member states—and for Russia—that an attack on NATO member Ukraine would be considered an attack on all.

If Europe is to take the lead in some way, it must not be in such a manner that conveys Western weakness in the face of Putin’s aggression. Nor should it be Europe on its own without American involvement. Whatever form it takes, the transatlantic alliance will need to strongly signal its commitment to Ukraine. [I am OK with Europe taking the lead, but genuine U.S. participation is essential if for no other reason than a Ukrainian victory is in out vital national security interests. To think otherwise is dangerously naïve. RAM]

David J. Kramer

David J. Kramer, executive director of the George W. Bush Institute, served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova from 2005 to 2008. AND an original and ongoing member of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation’s Friends of Ukraine Network (FOUN).

ROBERT MCCONNELL
Co-Founder, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation
Director of External Affairs, Friends of Ukraine Network

Today’s email is entirely Mr. McConnell’s and does not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation and/or the Friends of Ukraine Network (FOUN).

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